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Abstract
Innovation policies are strategic tools for reinforcing long-term eco-
nomic growth. If the literature highlights the need for coordination among
national R&D policies, the need for transnational policies appears to be
less clear. Using a model à la Martin and Ottaviano (1999), we conduct a
welfare analysis in order to judge the effect of a centralized R&D subsidy
policy. If theoretical results suggest that this policy can improve efficiency
and equity, our welfare analysis shows that when there are few knowledge
spillovers between countries, then the policy leads to a conflict of interest.
In the case of strong international knowledge spillovers however, the con-
flict of interest disappears suggesting that innovation policies should first
focus on the development of knowledge flows between countries.
JEL classification: F43, H50, R12
keywords: agglomeration and growth models, innovation policy, welfare
criteria
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1 Introduction
Organization of the public sector is a crucial issue for all economies in or-
der to improve the efficiency of public interventions. Indeed, every country can
be viewed as an economic union of local jurisdictions. What is the best di-
vision of powers and budgetary resources between the different levels of power
within an economic union? The Traditional Theory of Fiscal Federalism (Tiebout
(1956), Musgrave (1959), Oates (1972)) investigates this question and shows
that central government should be responsible for redistributive and macroeco-
nomic stabilization policies as well as for public goods which provide services to
the whole population of the country. The main justification for the decentralized
levels of government are the provision of public goods and services, the con-
sumption of which is limited to their own jurisdiction. The result of this is the
so called Decentralized Theorem (Oates, 1972) which explains that by tailoring
outputs of local public goods to the particular preferences and circumstances
of their constituencies, local government provision increases economic welfare
beyond that which results from the more uniform levels of such services that are
likely to occur with national provision. The New Fiscal Federalism Theory puts
the Decentralized Theorem into perspective by showing that in the case where
local governments in the Economic Union have soft budget constraints, this may
lead to situations of excessive debt and sub-optimal allocation of resources. The
reason is that local governments can exploit the fiscal commons by shifting the
burdens of local programs onto the economic union as a whole. Nevertheless,
according to Besley and Coate (2003, p.2628) "the key insight remains that
heterogeneity and spillovers are correctly at the heart of the debate about the
gains from centralization" which are those highlighted by the Traditional Theory
of Fiscal Federalism.
In the case of the European Union, the Decentralized Theorem is partially
applied as some policies, which exceed the bounds of national interest like trade,
industrial or agricultural policies, are coordinated at the EU level. Others how-
ever, which also affect the whole EU economy and generate externalities, remain
decided and implemented by national authorities without real coordination. We
obviously consider innovation policies 1 which aim to strengthen the competi-
tiveness of an economy and which are often considered to be of vital importance
for long-term economic growth. Thus, it appears important to understand why
innovation policies are mainly implemented by national authorities without co-
ordination within the EU. Is it because policymakers consider knowledge and
innovation as national public goods? Is it because of the specific characteris-
tics of innovative activities that make centralized policies inefficient or for other
reasons? The aim of this paper is not to directly address these questions but
1as highlighted by the European Commission (2000), "the principal reference framework
for research activities in Europe is national"
2
rather to provide a new enlightenment that may partially explain the specific
organization of R&D policies within the European Union.
Although there is substantial literature suggesting the need of R&D policies
which would correct market inefficiencies, much less attention is paid to the spe-
cific question of the rationale for transnational R&D policy coordination within
an economic union. This question however is becoming increasingly important
because, as highlighted by Kuhlmann (2001), many indicators show a grow-
ing process of internationalization of innovation activities due to the growing
complexity of the knowledge required. Among them we can note the increas-
ing volume of cross-border technology transfer via cooperation and strategic
alliances in R&D activities as well as the increasingly global organization of the
R&D activities of multinational firms. In this context, it appears necessary to co-
ordinate national R&D policies in order to improve their global efficiency. More
theoretically, the first contributions analyzing R&D policies in an imperfectly
competitive market with knowledge spillovers between firms (D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin, 1987) show that cooperation in the R&D stage of production is
welfare enhancing. Later, Haaland and Kind (2006) show that in an R&D sub-
sidy game without spillovers between two producer countries (belonging to the
same economic union), the uncoordinated outcome leads to inefficient levels of
subsidies which can be corrected if R&D policies are completely coordinated.
Chu (2009), using an open-economy growth model with technological spillovers,
analyzes the growth and welfare effects of an R&D subsidy policy according to
different public authority organizations. He, like Haaland and Kind (2006), shows
that the optimum is reached when the two countries cooperate. He also models
the case where the two countries form an economic union in which the R&D pol-
icy is managed by the central government but each national government chooses
their own optimal level of R&D expenditure. In this case, the equilibrium tax
rate and the level of public R&D investment are higher than the optimum so that
there is an overprovision of R&D spending. This is due to the fact that in such
an economic union there is a common-pool effect in which each region will try to
externalize the tax burden of its research spending to the other country (c.f new
fiscal federalism theory). Moreover, if the growth rate in the economic union is
higher than in the cooperative case, it is the opposite concerning the welfare.
The author also shows that there is a critical value of international knowledge
spillovers above (below) which the welfare associated with a centralized R&D
policy at the economic union level is higher (lower) than those associated with
non cooperative R&D policies.
Therefore, although empirical and theoretical results converge towards the
idea that R&D policies in an economic union should be coordinated, the effective-
ness of centralized R&D policies does not appear as obvious due to the strategic
3
behavior of national governments2. We can however, easily find arguments in
favor of directly establishing of R&D policies at a transnational level. For in-
stance, in some specific fields of research that concern all countries and need a
high critical mass of R&D inputs, this can be more efficient when implemented
at a transnational level.
In this paper, we take a different approach to the papers presented above
by using an agglomeration and growth model à la Martin and Ottaviano (1999).
We use this framework as it realizes a synthesis between the endogenous growth
model à la Romer (1990) and the New Economic Geography model à la Martin
and Rogers (1995) thereby allowing us to take income, growth and spatial effects
into account. Moreover, this framework is appropriate for the European context.
Indeed, we assume a world composed of two countries with different levels of
wealth in which capital is perfectly mobile and labor is immobile. This framework
has already been used by Martin (1999), Riou (2003) and Montmartin (2010)
to analyze the effects of public policies. Concerning innovation policies, the
common result is that such policies can reach objectives of both higher efficiency
and equity3. Thus, we will try to highlight some reasons which could explain why
such policies achieving both the European Commission objectives are so difficult
to implement at the European level. Indeed if some R&D policies like Framework
Programs or the new Regional Policy are implemented at the European level, they
represent a very small proportion of public R&D expenditure in the European
Union. Moreover, as is highlighted by Brehon (2010), the richer countries or the
so-called austerity coalition4 try to impose limits during each European budget
negociation.
To explain these facts, we investigate the optimality of a centralized subsidy
policy for R&D employment according to four different welfare criteria and dif-
ferent levels of economic integration5. Our results suggest that whatever the
level of economic integration, if the central government priority is to increase
global welfare or to improve the situation of the poorest country, then the cen-
tral authority has to implement an important R&D subsidy policy. Based on the
2As Chu (2009) has noted "In the EU, although the research priorities of the Framework
Program are not chosen directly by any national government, the member states may influ-
ence the European Parliament and the council through interest groups. As the study by the
European Institute of Romania suggests, this process of political negotiations could lead to an
unnecessary increase in the number of research priorities".
3Note that Montmartin (2010) shows that this is true only if the innovation policy does
not change the geography of innovative activities.
4This coalition refers to the six European members (Germany, France, United Kingdom,
Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands) who signed the "lettre des six" in 2003. In this let-
ter, these countries expressed their concern about budget proposals made by the European
Commission (considered as too high) and argued in favor of a budget limit set at 1% of the
European GDP.
5In this paper, we define economic integration as trade integration as well as knowledge
integration, i.e, the capacity of a country to access knowledge produced in other countries.
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idea however, that the central decision for this policy is the result of political
negotiations with national authorities, we propose a new welfare criterion taking
global as well as individual considerations into account. In our point of view,
this is a better reflection of the constraints and/or the necessary conditions for
implementing central policies in the European Union. According to this welfare
criterion, we show that in the case where international knowledge spillovers are
low or at an intermediate level, then the optimum is obtained when the central
government does not implement the policy. The reason is that this policy will
increase the welfare of the poorer country but will also reduce the welfare of the
richer country who is the major financial backer. This therefore leads to a conflict
of interest between regions. The only case where the implementation of a cen-
tralized R&D policy is optimal (according to this welfare criterion) is when the
international knowledge spillovers are high. This result is consistent with those
of Chu (2009) who shows that the implementation of an R&D subsidy policy by
a supranational government improves welfare compared to the non cooperative
case if international knowledge spillovers are high. In any case, our result is
able to partially justify the behavior of richer countries towards European R&D
policies and especially towards the Regional Policy6. Indeed, we could reason-
ably assume that international knowledge spillovers are not really high among
European countries due to frequent knowledge transfer barriers, as evidenced
by empirical studies (see for instance Maurseth and Verspagen, 2002). Conse-
quently, to facilitate the establishment of a centralized R&D policy in the EU,
our main recommendation is that European policies should first focus upon the
strengthening and development of knowledge flows between European countries.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the gen-
eral framework. Section 3 presents our assumptions concerning the innovation
process and defines the steady state of our economy. After having briefly re-
called the effects of an innovation policy on the equilibrium outcome, section 4
proposes a welfare analysis of such a policy. Section 5 discusses the results and
brings them into perspective.
2 The framework
The general framework is based upon Martin and Ottaviano (1999). The
economy is composed of two countries a and b, two factors of production (L
and K), three private sectors (T ,M and I) and one public sector. The labor
(L) endowment of each country is fixed and equal to L whereas the knowledge
capital (K) is produced by the Innovative sector (I). Contrary to the knowledge
capital which is supposed to be perfectly mobile, labor is geographically immobile
but sectorially mobile.
6see Mesclier (2007), chapter 2, p.138 for details
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I-sector is perfectly competitive and produces one unit of K with aI units of
L. I-Firms sell blueprints of variety to Manufacturing firms (M) with a infinite-
lived patent which gives them a perpetual monopoly rent. M-firms face Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition and increasing returns. Each differentiated
variety is produced by a single M-firm using β units of L and one unit of K.
The Traditional sector (T) is perfectly competitive and produces an homogeneous
good using one unit of L. Trade in M-varieties is subject to Iceberg cost whereas
trade is costless in the T-sector. Finally, in our model the public sector has
a merely redistributive role, i.e, it can tax the monopoly rent of M-firms7 to
subsidize employment in the I-sector. Here, we assume that the government
does not geographically differentiate the tax rate or the level of subsidy such
that T = Ta = Tb and S = Sa = Sb, i.e, the tax rate on M-firms as well as the
level of subsidy per unit of labor used in R&D are the same in both countries.
In what follows, we assume that the T-sector is active in both countries at the
equilibrium. Using the homogeneous good as numéraire, the wage rate and the
price of this good are equal to one. We summarized the basic structure of the
model in figure 1 below.




 ba TTT == 
 ba SSS == 





















 β 


 Ia 

Figure 1 : Basic structure of the model
7Note that in our model a proportional tax on the operating profit of M-firms is equivalent
to a tax on GDP to within one constant (see Montmartin (2010)).
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2.1 Consumption and production
Let Nw be the number of differentiated varieties available in the economy. Con-
sumer preferences are given by a Cobb-Douglas utility function and intertemporal
CES function with unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution:∫ ∞
0
ln
[
D(t)αH(t)1−α
]
e−ρtdt (1)
where H is the consumption of the homogeneous good, ρ ∈ [0; 1] is the time
preference and α ∈ [0; 1] represents the share of expenditure devoted to the
consumption of differentiated goods. Demand for differentiated goods in country
a is represented by a CES function à la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977):
Da(t) =
[∫ Na
0
Daa(t)
σ−1
σ da+
∫ Nb
0
Dba(t)
σ−1
σ da
] σ
σ−1
(2)
Na(Nb) denote the number of varieties produced in region a (b) such that Nw =
Na + Nb and σ represents the elasticity of substitution between varieties as
well as the price elasticity of demand for each variety. The expenditure of a
representative consumer located in country a is given by:
Ea(t) =
[∫ Na
0
Daa(t)P
a
a da+
∫ Nb
0
Dba(t)P
b
ada+ PHHa
]
(3)
Daa and Dba are the demands for a variety produced in country a and b of a
consumer located in a. P aa and P ba are prices of the i-th variety produced in a
and b. In what follows we leave implicit the dependence of variables on time
except for initial variables subscripted by 0.
Consumers solve their maximization problem in two separate steps. First,
consumer maximizes his utility (1) with respect to his budget constraint (3).
For a representative consumer located in country a, we have:
Ha = (1− α)Ea (4)
Daa =
αEa(P aa )−σ
∆
Dba =
αEa(P ba)−σ
∆
(5)
∆ =
∫ Na
0
(P aa )
1−σ +
∫ Nb
0
(P ba)
1−σ
Second, the representative consumer achieves an intertemporal trade off be-
tween consumption and saving. As in Grossman and Helpman (1991, chp.3),
saving takes place in the form of a riskless asset that pays an interest rate r or
7
in the form of investment in shares of M-firms on a world stock market8. By
this market, M-firms finance their unit of knowledge capital required to produce.
Therefore, individual income is composed of the wage rate equal to one and
of the investment returns in M-firms. Some shares of M-firms endowment or
knowledge capital Ka(0) and Kb(0) are assumed to be owned by consumers
from the start with an inequality such that:
Ka(0) > Kb(0) (6)
This initial asymmetry will lead to an income and expenditure inequality between
countries. The free capital mobility hypothesis ensures a symmetric yield of
shares and therefore the incentives to accumulate capital are the same in both
countries. This implies that the share of knowledge capital owned by each
country is stable over time and given by the initial distribution (6).
In this second step, the consumer maximizes his utility (1) with respect to
his intertemporal budget constraint which is given by:
z˙ = w + rz − Ea
where z is the value of the assets’ stock of a representative consumer. Solving
the Hamiltonian, we obtain the Euler equation for the evolution of expenditure:
E˙a
Ea
= r − ρ (7)
The growth rate of individual expenditure in country a is equal to the dif-
ference between the interest rate and the rate of time preference. Note that
as consumers’ preferences are the same in both countries, the growth rate of
expenditure is also the same.
On the supply side, M-firms have the same technology and we assume that
the tax rate is the same in both regions9, so we can write the post-tax operating
profit of an M-firm located in country a as:
Πa =
[
(P aaD
a
a + P
a
b D
a
b )− β(Daa + τDab )
]
L(1− T ) (8)
As trade in M-varieties is subject to Iceberg cost, τ > 1 units must be shipped to
sell one unit abroad which explains why M-firms have to produce τDab to meet
foreign demand. Maximization of profit implies that M-firms mark up price over
marginal cost by a factor of σ/(σ− 1). Using a corresponding expression of (8)
for country b, the optimal pricing policy of M-firms is given by:
P aa = P
b
b =
βσ
σ − 1 P
a
b = P
b
a =
τβσ
σ − 1 (9)
8In this kind of model, firm shares are riskless assets because they will reflect the real value
of firms. This is due to the fact that we remove the case of a speculative bubble.
9This hypothesis reflects the fact that most of the EU budget comes from a uniform tax
applied to the GDP of each member.
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As firms’ and consumers’ behavior is the same in both regions, we can rewrite
the operating profit of a firm located in region a, b as:
Πa,b =
βxa,b
σ − 1(1− T ) (10)
where xa,b represents the total production of a firm located in country a, b.
2.2 Location equilibrium of the industrial sector
In a first step, we introduce optimal prices (9) in demand functions (5) to
obtain optimal demands of a consumer located in region a:
Daa =
σ − 1
βσ
αEa
Na + φNb
Dba =
σ − 1
βσ
αEaτ−σ
Na + φNb
(11)
where φ = τ1−σ represents the level of trade integration. Following Martin
and Rogers (1995), τ is related to the quality of transport infrastructures. A
reduction of τ corresponds to an improvement of transport infrastructures and
therefore to an increase of φ ( dφ/dτ< 0).
We now have to define the condition which ensures equilibrium on the dif-
ferentiated goods market. Using expressions (11) and corresponding expressions
for region b, we obtain the level of production in each country:
xa =
αL(σ − 1)
βσNw
(
Ea
[sn + φ(1− sn)] +
φEb
[φsn + (1− sn)]
)
(12)
xb =
αL(σ − 1)
βσNw
(
φEa
[sn + φ(1− sn)] +
Eb
[φsn + (1− sn)]
)
(13)
where sn = Na/Nw is the share of M-firms located in country a. With
perfect capital mobility, location equilibrium must satisfy the condition of equality
of post tax operating profit. Indeed, for a constant share of manufacturing firms
(sn) exists, M-firms must have no incentives to relocate their production, i.e,
Πa(1− T ) =Π b(1− T ). Using equations (12) and (13), we get:
sn =
se − φ(1− se)
(1− φ) (14)
where se = Ea/Ew is the share of expenditure and income held by consumers
located in country a. Note that the higher the trade integration, the higher
the concentration of M-firms in the richer country. Finally, we can establish the
equilibrium production of M-firms for a given level of expenditure by introducing
(14) in (12):
x = αL
σ − 1
βσ
Ew
Nw
(15)
9
Expression (15) corresponds to the optimal production of all M-firms (regardless
of their location).
3 Innovation Production Function, location of R&D
and the steady state
3.1 Innovation process and knowledge externalities
In this model, the innovation sector works as in Grossman and Helpman
(1991, chap.3). Innovation corresponds to the increase in the number of avail-
able M-varieties and is a constant returns to scale activity for individual firms.
It produces however, increasing external returns to scale. In order to produce
one unit of knowledge capital, researchers must use aI units of labor. Following
Romer (1990), we assume that aI follows a learning curve, i.e, the marginal cost
of one unit of knowledge capital decreases gradually as the number of M-firms
increases (R&D productivity increases with the number of M-firms). Therefore,
knowledge spillovers are transmitted from production to design. Moreover, we
make the assumption as Baldwin and al. (2001) that these knowledge exter-
nalities are partially localized. This implies that a country’s production cost for
knowledge capital depends negatively on the number of national M-firms and
to a lesser extent on the number of M-firms located in the other country. It
refers to the idea that intranational spillovers or Marshall-Arrow-Romer exter-
nalities (Glaeser and al., 1992) are stronger than international spillovers that are
transmitted by trade for instance (Feldman, 2000). This assumption is directly
related to the stylized fact that knowledge spillovers are geographically bounded
and decrease as geographical distance increases.
Central government uses the tax revenue to subsidy I-firms. More specifically,
we assume that it gives a subsidy per unit of labor employed in R&D 10. In this
paper, we only consider the case where the government does not differentiate
the level of subsidy according to regions (Sa = Sb = S). Two reasons explain
this choice. Firstly, if the subsidy policy is undifferentiated then the location of
innovative firms is not affected at the equilibrium which simplifies the analysis11.
Secondly, it is more interesting to highlight some issues in the best case, i.e,
when the subsidy policy has the higher positive effects on the economy than
when the subsidy policy is differentiated (see Montmartin, 2010).
We can summarize these assumptions by the following innovation production
function:
10The main justification for this choice is technical as a subsidy on the total cost of innovation
would render the model unstable.
11see Montmartin (2010) for a geographically differentiated subsidy policy.
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K˙w =
LI
aI
=
LaI
aaI
+
LbI
abI
aaI ≡
1
KwAa
abI ≡
1
KwAb
(16)
Aa = sn + λ(1− sn) Ab = λsn + 1− sn
where aaI and a
b
I represent the productivity of R&D in regions a and b, Aa
and Ab represent knowledge externalities for I-firms located in country a and b,
LaI and L
b
I are the quantity of labor employed in R&D in regions a and b and
λ ∈ [0, 1] is the level of international knowledge spillovers, i.e, the geographical
scope of knowledge spillovers. Using (16) and the fact that the wage rate is
equal to one, we can write the cost of producing one unit of knowledge capital
in countries a and b as:
F aI =
1− S
KwAa
F bI =
1− S
KwAb
where S represents the amount of subsidy per unit of labor employed in R&D ac-
tivities. Note that R&D activities will only locate in both regions when the cost
of producing one unit of knowledge capital is the same. With imperfect interna-
tional knowledge spillovers (λ < 1), it is less costly to locate in the country with
the highest number of M-firms. As Ka(0) > Kb(0), the income of consumers
in country a is higher than in country b for all t because initial endowments
represent pure rents. Therefore, more M-firms locate in country a, see (14),
thereby rendering R&D productivity higher in this country. Consequently, the
whole I-sector will locate in the richer country to benefit from higher knowledge
spillovers. Thus, the cost of innovation for I-firms is given by FI = F aI .
In order to express the level of subsidies, we have to find the world labor
demand for R&D activities using expressions (16):
LI =
g
A
(17)
where LI is the world quantity of labor employed in R&D activities, g is the
aggregate growth rate and A = Aa.
In this model, we assume that the government has a balanced budget con-
straint. The rule of balanced budget for the government is satisfied when the
tax income is equal to expenditure. The government tax revenue is the sum of
taxes collected from the Nw M-firms which corresponds to T times the tax base:
R = T
αLEw
σ
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Total government expenditure is simply equal to the quantity of labor employed
in R&D multiplied by the amount of the subsidy:
TE = LIS
Using these expressions and (17), we can express the level of subsidy satisfying
the balanced budget constraint as:
S = T
αLAEw
σg
(18)
3.2 Labor market equilibrium and the growth rate
3.2.1 Labor market
As the labor is sectorially mobile, it will be used in all three private sectors
of the economy. The world labor supply is fixed and equal to 2L. Labor demand
in the T-sector is obtained from (4). The quantity of labor used in the M-
sector corresponds to the product of the individual production of firms (15), the
number of M-firms (Nw) and the marginal need for labor (β). Labor demand in
the I-sector is simply given by (17). Therefore, the equilibrium condition for the
labor market is:
2L =
g
A
+ LeEw
(
σ − α
σ
)
(19)
As the labor supply is a constant, an equilibrium exists if and only if the demand
for labor is also constant. Note that in (19), all terms are parameters excepting
Ew. Thus, Ew has to be constant over time to have an equilibrium. This
condition is crucial as according to (7), this implies:
r = ρ (20)
Expression (20) means that the interest rate of riskless assets is constant and
equal to the rate of time preference.
3.2.2 The equilibrium growth rate
The equilibrium growth rate is derived from the incentives to innovate. This
requires the traditional condition of no opportunity for arbitrage between invest-
ing in R&D and borrowing at the safe rate r. Call v(t) the stock market value
of a M-firm. This value corresponds to the present discounted value of its post
tax operating profit. That is,
v(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−[R(s)−R(t)]
βx(s)
σ − 1 (1− T )ds (21)
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where R(t) =
∫ t
0 r(u)du is the cumulative discount factor applicable to profits
earned from the period 0 to t. Differentiating (21) with respect to time gives us
the no arbitrage condition which has to hold at every moment in time in order
to ensure stock market equilibrium:
v˙ +
βx
σ − 1(1− T ) = rv (22)
With conditions of free entry and zero profits in the I-sector, the value of a firm
is equal to the price of one unit of knowledge capital, i.e, the marginal cost of
innovation F . With a wage rate equal to one, we have the following equality at
the equilibrium:
F = v =
(1− S)
KwA
(23)
At the steady state, A and (1 − S) are constants. We can therefore easily
calculate the growth rate of a firm’s value:
F˙
F
=
v˙
v
= −g (24)
The growth rate of the firm’s value is equal to the inverse of the growth rate
of new varieties; the reason being that an increase of the growth rate means
that more firms enter in the market. This increases the competition in the M-
sector thereby reducing individual profit. The value of a firm being the present
discounted value of its profit, it follows that the value of a firm decreases when
growth is positive. Substituting (15), (20), (23), (24) in (22), we can express
the no arbitrage condition as:
αLEwA(1− T )
σ(1− S) = ρ+ g (25)
To obtain the equilibrium growth rate, we have to substitute the expressions (18)
and (19) in (25). We have to find the solution of a second degree polynomial
function in g. There are two solutions but we are most interested in the case
where the growth rate is positive, that is:
g =

Λ+
√
Λ2 + 8ασρALT
2σ
si T ∈ [0, 1[
−ρ otherwise12
(26)
Λ = α[2AL− ρT ]− ρ(σ − α)
12When the tax rate is equal to one, the growth rate is negative; the reason being that,
if the government taxes all profits, M-firms cannot give owners a dividend. Therefore, no
consumer will invest in M-firms and the no arbitrage condition (26) is satisfied for g = −ρ.
The government will therefore never fix the tax rate at one.
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Expression (26) tells us that a higher spatial concentration of M-firms in country
a will lead to a higher aggregate growth rate. The reason is simply that the
spatial concentration of the industrial sector in the richer country increases R&D
productivity which in turn increases the incentives to innovate and hence the
growth rate. Note also that parameters λ,α and L have a positive effect on
growth whereas parameters σ and ρ have the opposite effect. In economic
terms, this means that a wider dissemination of knowledge between countries
and a "more innovative economy" (a higher differenciation of products and a
higher consumption of these goods) lead to a higher growth rate.
3.3 Income inequality and the steady state equilibrium
3.3.1 Income inequality and growth
To obtain the steady state of the model, we have to define a last equilibrium
relation. We have already defined how the equilibrium location of M-firms (sn)
is determined by expenditure inequality (14) and how the equilibrium growth
rate g depends on sn (26). The last relation defines the income and expenditure
inequality as a function of g. We know that in both regions nominal expenditure
and income of consumers are stable at the steady state. The consumer’s income
is the sum of his labor income plus his capital income. Concerning labor income,
each worker perceives a salary equal to one at each period. Concerning capital
income, it should be noted that in both regions, the consumers’ capital stock
grows at rate g and the value of one unit of capital decreases at rate g. Thus,
the value of capital income is stable over time. The consumer will then consume
his labor income and ρ times the value of the initial per-capita stock of assets as
only the profits of this initial stock are pure rents. The income and expenditure
of a representative consumer are therefore given by:
Ea = 1 +
ρKa(0)v(0)
L
et Eb = 1 +
ρKb(0)v(0)
L
Inserting (23), we can rewrite these expressions as
Ea = 1 +
ρsk(1− S)
LA
and Eb = 1 +
ρ(1− sk)(1− S)
LA
(27)
Using expressions (19) and (26) and inserting them into expressions (27), we
can express the equilibrium relation between the income inequality (se) and the
growth rate (g):
se =
1
2
+
αρ(2sk − 1)(1− T )
2σ(g + ρ)
(28)
where sk = Ka/Kw represents the share of world capital stock owned by
consumers located in country a. Note that, as long as sk > 1/2 and T < 1, the
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nominal income is higher in country a than in country b. Moreover, it should be
noted that the income and expenditure gap decreases in g; the reason being that
a higher growth rate implies higher competition in the M-sector and therefore
a reduction of individual profit. It should be remembered that the value of a
firm is the present discounted value of its profits. As income from capital is a
more important part of total income in country a than in country b, the fall in
the firm’s value will have a higher impact on consumers in country a. For this
reason, the income inequality between countries decreases with the growth rate.
3.3.2 The steady state
To close the model, we have to define the equilibrium location of M-firms
and the growth rate at the steady state. Inserting expressions (26) and (28) in
(14), we get the following equilibrium relation:
sn =
1
2
+
αρ(1− T )(2sk − 1)
ρ(α+ σ) +
√
Λ2 + 8ALTασρ+ α(2AL− ρT )
(
1 + φ
1− φ
)
(29)
with A = sn + λ(1− sn)
We can rewrite (29) as f(sn) : asn3 + bsn2 + csn + d = 0. This implies that
sn is the solution of a third degree polynomial function. The solution of this
polynomial function is given in appendix A. To obtain the equilibrium growth
rate, we have to replace the solution of (29) in expression (26).
4 Subsidy policy for innovation, welfare and conflict
of interest
In this last section, our objective is threefold. Firstly, we will describe the impacts
of the subsidy policy on the consumer’s welfare in both countries. Secondly, we
will investigate the optimality of such a policy according to different welfare crite-
ria and levels of economic integration. Here, the notion of economic integration
refers to the level of trade integration as well as the level of knowledge integra-
tion, i.e, the level of international knowledge spillovers. Thirdly, using welfare
analysis, we highlight a conflict of interest between countries that could partly
explain the difficulties in implementing such a policy at the European level.
4.1 Effects of the innovation subsidy policy on growth and equity
As the main objective of the European Commission is to promote a more
sustained and balanced growth, we briefly recall the theoretical impact of an
innovation policy upon growth and equity before analyzing its effects upon wel-
fare. Using the same framework, Martin (1999) analyzed in partial equilibrium,
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different public policies implemented by the European Union. His results sug-
gest that only a policy which reduces the cost of innovation is able to achieve
both the European Commission’s objectives. Other policies such as investment
in transport infrastructures lead to a trade off between growth and equity.
Given the strategic shift of the New European Regional Policy (2007-2013)
towards innovation and the fact that previous works are realized in partial equi-
librium, Montmartin (2010) investigates the impacts of a subsidy policy to R&D
employment upon growth and equity taking funding issues into account, i.e, in
general equilibrium. We refer the reader to this paper in order to have a complete
analysis of this innovation subsidy policy. In what follows, we simply highlight
the main mechanisms coming into play. Nevertheless, we give a proof of this
result in appendix B.
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Figure 2 : Main effects of the innovation policy on the equilibrium
If the government raises the tax rate on M-firms’ profit then M-firms’ value
decreases. We know that a part of the consumer’s wealth is composed of shares
in M-firms so that the consumers’ nominal income decreases. As a greater
share of the consumers in country a’s income is related to capital, the income
inequality decreases, see (28). Furthermore, the increase in the tax rate allows
the government to increase the level of the subsidy and therefore to decrease
the cost of innovation so that the aggregate growth rate increases13. As we
13More exactly, the growth rate increases because the fall of the innovation cost is higher
than the decrease of M-firms value so that the incentives to innovate increase.
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can see from equation (28), a higher growth rate will also decrease the income
inequality. The location of industrial activities being directly related to income
inequality, see (14), a decrease of income inequality leads some industrial firms
to delocate from the richer country to the poorer. Thus, the subsidy policy for
R&D employment will reduce the concentration of industrial activities as well
as the income inequality and increase the aggregate growth rate. This would
therefore lead to a more efficient and equitable economic equilibrium.
From the point of view of equity and growth, the central authority should
implement the largest possible subsidy policy to R&D employment. The question
then is to determine whether the result is the same where the consumer’s welfare
is concerned.
4.2 Indirect utility and welfare criteria
Grossman and Helpman (1991) showed that in models with monopolistic
competition and horizontal product innovation, the market equilibrium is Pareto-
efficient if and only if there are no knowledge spillovers in the innovation pro-
duction function. If however, we assume the presence of knowledge spillovers
then the market equilibrium is sub-optimal from the point of view of the planner.
Indeed, as current research has a positive spillover on the productivity of future
research, a planner would engage in more R&D activity than the decentralized
economy. But, as Martin and Ottaviano (1999) highlight, another distortion
suggests that the spatial equilibrium concentration of industrial activities is not
optimal. Indeed, investors do not take the positive impact of the spatial concen-
tration on the aggregate growth rate into account when they decide where to
invest their capital. Thus, the concentration of firms in the richer country is too
low given that an increase of the concentration will increase the aggregate growth
rate. In other words, with knowledge spillovers, the Pareto-efficient equilibrium
corresponds to a higher growth rate associated with a higher concentration of
manufacturing firms than the market outcome. It should be remembered that
the implementation of the innovation subsidy policy will lead to a reduction of
industrial sector concentration compared to the market outcome. Consequently,
we already know that the innovation subsidy policy will lead, in the best case,
to a second best allocation.
We measure individual welfare using the indirect utility of consumers. Call
Va and Vb the indirect utility of a representative consumer in countries a and b.
Using equations (1), (4), (5) and (27), we obtain the following expressions:
Va =
1
ρ
log
[
C
(
1 +
ρsk(1− S)
LA
)
(sn(1− φ) + φ)
α
σ−1 e
αg
ρ(σ−1)
]
(30)
Vb =
1
ρ
log
[
C
(
1 +
ρ(1− sk)(1− S)
LA
)
(1− sn(1− φ))
α
σ−1 e
αg
ρ(σ−1)
]
(31)
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with
C = αα(1− α)1−αNw(0)
α
σ−1
(
σ−1
βσ
)
We adopt Charlot et al’s (2006) approach which applies different welfare ap-
proaches to Krugman’s (1991) Core-periphery model to compare agglomeration
and dispersion outcomes. In our case, we propose to discuss and compare opti-
mality of outcomes obtained with and without subsidy policy using four different
welfare criteria. Moreover, as was previously mentioned, these comparisons will
be made according to different levels of economic integration. Unfortunately,
and contrary to Charlot et al. (2006), given the complexity of the model, we will
be obliged to use simulations. Among the four criteria, three are classical welfare
criteria (Bentham, Rawls and Pareto) which define the notion of optimality in
very different ways. For instance, the Bentham criterion only takes global welfare
into account which implies (for the government) choosing T which maximizes
the sum of national welfares:
max
T
W = Va(T ) + Vb(T )
The Rawls criterion focuses on the improvement of the poorest consumer’s situa-
tion which implies choosing T and thereby maximizing the welfare of the poorest
representative consumer:
max
T
W = min [Va(T ), Vb(T )]
Contrary to the Bentham criterion, the Pareto criterion focuses upon individual
welfare. The optimum is defined as a situation where the government is not able
to improve the situation of one agent without reducing the welfare of others. In
our model, it implies choosing T which maximizes the welfare in country b for a
given value of welfare in country a:
max
T
Vb(T )
s.t Va(T ) = V ∗a
If these three criteria define different optimum concepts, each of them only con-
siders one specific aspect in the sense that Betham considers only global welfare,
Rawls only the welfare of the poorest agent and Pareto only individual welfare.
We therefore propose to refine the Bentham criterion in order to take global
as well as individual aspects into account. This fourth criterion, that we will
call, the Individually Constrained Bentham (ICB) criterion, defines as optimum,
the situation where global welfare is as high as possible with the constraint that
individual welfare is at least as high as in the free market equilibrium outcome.
According to this criterion, the government will choose T which maximizes global
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welfare given the constraint that individual welfare in each country has to be, at
least, at the same level as in the case where the policy is not implemented:
max
T
W = Va(T ) + Vb(T )
s.t Va(T ) ≥ Va(0) (1)
Vb(T ) ≥ Vb(0) (2)
4.3 Effects of the innovation subsidy policy on the consumer’s welfare
In order to grasp the different impacts of the innovation subsidy policy upon
the consumer’s welfare, we will analyze the derivative of expressions (30) and
(31) with respect to T :
dVa
dT
=
α
ρ(σ − 1)
(1− φ)
(sn(1− φ) + φ)
dsn
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
transport cost effect
+
1
ρ
dlogEa
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth effect
+
α
ρ2(σ − 1)
dg
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth effect
(32)
dVb
dT
= − α
ρ(σ − 1)
(1− φ)
(1− sn(1− φ)
dsn
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
transport cost effect
+
1
ρ
dlogEb
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth effect
+
α
ρ2(σ − 1)
dg
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth effect
(33)
The first term of expressions (32) and (33) or the transport cost effect refers
to the impact of the tax rate upon the consumer’s welfare via its effect upon
the location of manufacturing firms. Indeed, it should be remembered that an
increase of the tax rate reduces income inequality and leads to a delocation of
some M-firms from country a to country b. Therefore, consumers from country b
will save the transport cost on the goods produced by M-firms that move whereas
the opposite occurs in country a. This explains why the transport cost effect is
negative for country a and positive for country b. It should also be noted that
in absolute value, the impact of the transport cost effect is lower for country a
than for country b. In other words, the transport cost effect is positive according
to the Bentham criterion; the reason being that the movement of M-firms which
affects the price index in each region is lower in country a than in country b in
absolute value, i.e, the increase of the price index in region a is lower than the
decrease of the price index in region b.
The second term of expressions (32) and (33) or the wealth effect refers to
the impact of the tax rate upon the consumer’s welfare via its effect on nominal
income. It should be remembered that the value of knowledge capital decreases
with the level of subsidies, see (23), and that a higher tax rate will raise the
level of subsidies. An increase in the tax rate will therefore reduce the nominal
income in both countries but the effect will be stronger in the richer country (a)
as a more important part of the total income is related to capital income. To
summarize, the wealth effect is negative because it reduces the nominal income
in both countries but the effect is stronger in the richer country.
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The third term of expressions (32) and (33) or the growth effect refers to
the impact of the tax rate upon the consumer’s welfare via its effect on the
growth rate. As demonstrated by Montmartin (2010), in most cases, public
policy will increase the aggregate growth rate. A higher growth rate corresponds
to a stronger creation dynamic of industrial activities so that at each period the
number of M-firms increases. This greater dynamic will lead to a decrease of
price indexes in both regions and hence to an increase of real incomes. This
explains why the growth effect is positive.
In short, the innovation subsidy policy affects the consumer’s welfare by three
vectors. Firstly, say the wealth effect decreases welfare in both countries because
it reduces nominal income. Secondly, the growth effect increases welfare in both
countries because it raises the real income. Finally, the transport cost effect
is positive for consumers located in country b as opposed to those located in
country a as the innovation policy leads to a delocation of industrial activities
from country a to country b. The innovation subsidy policy will therefore have
a higher positive impact upon the consumer’s welfare in the poorer country, say
country b.
4.4 Optimality of the subsidy policy
In this sub-section, we will analyze the optimality of the innovation subsidy
policy according to the various welfare criteria defined previously and various
levels of economic integration. The value of parameters used for the simulations
presented below are based upon those of Martin and Ottaviano (1996).14 More-
over for technical reasons15, we restrict the definition domain of T from [0, 1[ to
[0, 0.99[.
4.4.1 The case of low international knowledge spillovers
Here, we will investigate the optimality of the innovation subsidy policy in an
economy characterized by very limited knowledge integration (we suppose that
λ = 0.1). If we fix the value of international knowledge spillovers, the figures
below represent the evolution of the welfare in each country and in the whole
economy for different levels of trade integration. We will then denote the optimal
tax rates as T ∗x where x is the abreviation of the welfare criterion retained (P
for Pareto, R for Rawls, B for Bentham and ICB for our welfare criterion).
14More precisely the values of the parameters used are : α = 0.5, σ = 3, ρ = 0.1, L =
0.4, and sk = 0.7
15Indeed, in some cases welfare increases with the tax rate, so that there is no optimal
policy. It is necessary to impose this restriction if we are to systematically obtain an optimal
tax rate.
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We can see in figures 3a and 3b that an increase in the tax rate (whatever the
level of trade integration) has a conflicting effect upon consumer welfare. Indeed,
whereas the tax rate raises the consumer’s welfare in country b, the consumer’s
welfare in country a decreases along with the tax rate. Consequently, all tax rates
in [0,0.99] are Pareto-optimal, i.e, the government cannot improve welfare in one
country without reducing welfare in the other country. According to the Rawls
criterion, the government should implement the largest possible subsidy policy
(T ∗R = 0.99) whereas according to the ICB criterion, the government should
not implement the innovation subsidy policy (T ∗BIC = 0). Two reasons explain
the conflicting effect of the subsidy policy. Firstly, the transport cost effect is
positive for region b whereas it is negative for region a (see 4.1.2). Secondly,
the growth effect which is positive for both regions decreases in λ, i.e, the level
of international knowledge spillovers. It should be remembered that the subsidy
policy leads to a more dispersed geography of industrial activities which reduces
R&D productivity and limits the positive effect of this policy upon growth. We
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show in appendix C that the lower the international knowledge spillovers, the
higher the cost (in terms of growth reduction) of delocation of industrial activities
towards the poorer region. We can therefore express the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Consider an economy composed of two countries with dif-
ferent levels of wealth. If the international knowledge spillovers are low then a
centralized subsidy policy for R&D employment has a positive (negative) effect
upon the welfare of consumers located in the poorer (richer) country. There
therefore exists a conflict of interest between these countries.
As we can see in figure 3c, the Bentham-optimal tax rate does not corre-
spond to an extreme value of tax rate as it does for the other criteria. This
figure highlights a very interesting result. Indeed, the Bentham-optimal tax rate
decreases with the level of trade integration whereas this is not the case for the
other criteria. This means that the government’s optimal intervention (accord-
ing to this criterion) should decrease in a context of increasing trade integration.
The reason for this result is that the higher the level of trade integration, the
higher the impact of the tax rate upon the delocation of industrial activities
(see proof in appendix C). Combining this with the fact that the delocation cost
(in terms of growth reduction) of industrial firms is higher for a low value of
international knowledge spillovers, it would appear logical that the level of the
Bentham-optimal tax rate decreases with the level of trade integration.
4.4.2 The case of an intermediate level of international knowledge
spillovers
Here, we will investigate the optimality of the innovation subsidy policy in
an economy characterized by an intermediate level of knowledge integration (we
suppose that λ = 0.4). As before, the figures below represent the evolution of
welfare in each region and within the whole economy for different levels of trade
integration.
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If we compare these figures with the previous ones, it appears that we have
the same result concerning the national consumer’s welfare. Indeed, the con-
sumer’s welfare in the richer country decreases with the tax rate whereas it
increases in the poorer country (whatever the level of trade integration). We
could therefore extend Proposition 1 to the case where international knowledge
spillovers are at an intermediate level. Indeed, as in the previous case, accord-
ing to the ICB criterion, the government should not implement the innovation
subsidy policy (T ∗ICB = 0) whereas according to the Rawls criterion, the govern-
ment should implement the largest possible subsidy policy (T ∗R = 0.99). Note
also that all tax rate values are Pareto-optimal because the government cannot
increase the welfare in one country without reducing it in the other. Finally, the
only difference with the case where international knowledge spillovers are low
is the Bentham-optimal level of tax rate. Indeed, as we can see in figure 4c,
the Bentham-optimal level of tax rate corresponds to the Rawls-optimal level
of tax rate whatever the level of trade integration. Therefore, according to the
Bentham criterion, the government should implement a wider public policy when
knowledge spillovers are less localized; the reason being that when knowledge
spillovers are less localized, the delocation cost (in terms of growth reduction)
of industrial activities towards the poorer region is less important. The fact that
the Bentham-optimal tax rate is defined by T ∗B = 0.99 means that the welfare
loss of consumers in the richer country is more than compensated by the welfare
gain for consumers in the poorer country.
4.4.3 The case of high international knowledge spillovers
Here, we investigate the optimality of the innovation subsidy policy in an
economy characterized by a high level of knowledge integration (we suppose
that λ = 0.7). As before, the figures below represent the evolution of welfare in
each country and in the whole economy for different levels of trade integration.
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Contrary to previous cases, when international knowledge spillovers are rel-
atively high, the consumer’s welfare in country a does not decrease with the
tax rate as we can see in figure 5a. Indeed, the tax rate has a positive (but
not continuous) impact upon the welfare in country a. From 0 to T ∗Vi , which
represents the tax rate that maximizes the consumer’s welfare in country a,
welfare increases. From T ∗Vi to T
∗
ICB welfare decreases but still remains higher
than without a subsidy policy. Therefore, all taxes rates between T ∗Vi and T
∗
ICB
are Pareto-optimal. It should also be noted that the tax rate which maximizes
consumers’ welfare in region a decreases with the level of trade integration; the
reason being that the higher the level of trade integration, the higher the impact
of the tax rate upon the delocation of manufacturing firms. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, the consumers located in country a lose more welfare because more firms
move to the poorer country so that they then have to consume more imported
varieties. We can also note that the consumer’s welfare in region b increases
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with the tax rate when knowledge spillovers are geographically well transmitted.
Hence, we can express the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Consider an economy composed of two countries with dif-
ferent levels of wealth. If the international knowledge spillovers are high then
a centralized subsidy policy to R&D employment can improve welfare in both
countries. Therefore, the implementation of the policy does not lead to a conflict
of interest between countries.
Consequently, it will be easier for the central authority to implement an
innovation subsidy policy in this case. This is due to the fact that in an economy
with high international knowledge spillovers, the geography of industrial activities
matters less for growth. Indeed, the negative impact of the subsidy policy on
the consumer’s welfare in country a via the delocation of a part of industrial
firms is less important whereas its positive impact via the growth rate is more
significant.
When international knowledge spillovers are high, welfare analysis highlights a
very interesting configuration. Indeed, in this case, the optimal tax rate according
to our four different criteria could correspond to the same value, i.e, T ∗ICB =
T ∗P = T
∗
B = T
∗
R. Indeed, according to the ICB, Bentham and Rawls criteria,
the optimal level of tax rate is T = 0.99. According to the Pareto criterion,
T = 0.99 corresponds to one optimum (but it is not the only one). The positive
effect of a centralized innovation policy is clearly apparent in this case.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, our objective was to provide new elements to explain the difficulty
of establishing a real innovation policy at the European level. To this end, we
have used an agglomeration and growth model à la Martin and Ottaviano (1999)
into which we have introduced a central government which is able to implement
a subsidy policy for R&D employment. Previous works by Martin (1999) and
Montmartin (2010) have shown that an innovation subsidy policy which does
not change the geography of innovation is able to simultaneously increase the
efficiency and the equity of the economy. We show in this paper however, that
if we analyze the impact of this policy in terms of welfare, the results are more
contrasting. Indeed, we have seen that this innovation policy, in an economy
composed of two countries with different levels of wealth, could have opposite
effects on the consumer’s welfare, depending upon the country. More specifically,
our results suggest that, if the international knowledge spillovers are not strong
then the implementation of an innovation subsidy policy leads to a conflict of
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interest between regions in the sense that the welfare of consumers in the richer
country decreases whereas that of those in the poorer country increases. Our
result can therefore be viewed as an explanation for the difficulties involved in
implementing centralized innovation policies at the European level. Indeed, it
will be harder to implement centralized policies in an economic union if some
countries suffer from it (especially if they are the policy’s main backers). We
think that this result might also be relevant when explaining why richer countries
in the European Union, such as Germany, France or the United Kingdom are
so critical of the policies implemented by the European Union, especially the
Regional Policy. It should be noted that this result supposes that international
knowledge spillovers are not really strong between countries. One might easily
think that this is still the case in the European Union due to the many knowledge
transfer barriers. Some of these are related to the properties of knowledge, like
tacitness and some of them are specific to the European Union, like the low
mobility of workers or the cultural, social and technological distance.
The welfare analysis also highlights the central role played by the diffusion of
knowledge among countries on the optimality of the policy. Indeed, we have seen
that the conflicts of interest between countries involved in the implementation
of the innovation policy disappears when international knowledge spillovers are
strong. In our model, the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers is a key
feature because it directly affects the productivity of R&D activities and the
cost of delocation industrial activities. More specifically, the higher the spatial
diffusion of knowledge, the higher the R&D productivity and the lower (in terms
of growth reduction) the cost of delocation industrial firms. Therefore, our
model suggest that it would be simpler and more efficient to implement an
innovation subsidy policy in an economic union in which countries can benefit
from knowledge produced in the others. In other words, in the European context,
this result means that before directly subsidizing R&D activities, the european
authorities should strengthen and develop the knowledge flows between European
countries. A number of public policies could contribute to the development of
knowledge flows, such as investment in ICT technologies, investment in human
capital (by developing the education and people’s absorption capacity) as well
as all public policies that can improve or facilitate the mobility of workers within
the economy. It should be noted however, that some european R&D policies
try to improve knowledge diffusion within the European Union. We especially
think of the Framework Programs which aim to strenghthen cooperations at the
European level and the mobility of researchers, although their effects are difficult
to measure (given the importance of national policies).
If knowledge integration strengthens the positive effects of an innovation
subsidy policy, it would seem that trade integration plays an opposite although
less important role. Indeed, in welfare analysis, we have seen that the optimal tax
rates decreases with the level of trade integration, i.e, government intervention
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should decrease with the level of trade integration. The reason for this is that
the higher the level of trade integration, the higher the impact of the tax rate
on the delocation of industrial activities towards the poorer region (see appendix
C). As R&D productivity and the growth rate are positively correlated with the
concentration of M-firms in the richer region, an increase of trade integration
will increase the negative impact of the subsidy policy. To conclude, our results
suggest that (1) contrary to knowledge integration, trade integration reduces the
effectiveness of a centralized subsidy policy and (2) the optimal level of subsidy
depends more upon the level of knowledge integration than upon the level of
trade integration.
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6 Appendix
Appendix A
The equilibrium location of manufacturing firms has to satisfy the condition
given by (29). We can rewrite (29) as a third degree polynomial function of sn:
f(sn) = asn3 + bsn2 + csn + d = 0 with
a = −8Lασρ(1− λ)(1− T )
b = −4Lαρ(1− T )
Lα(1 + φ)(1− λ)(1− 2sk) + σ(1− φ)
[
ρ+ 2L(2λ− 1)
]
(1− φ)
c =
2αρ(1− T )
[
(1− 2sk)(1 + φ)(Lα(1− 3λ)− ρα(1− T ))
]
1− φ
+
2αρ(1− T )
[
ρσ(1− 3φ+ 2sk(1 + φ))− Lσ(1− φ)(1− 5λ)
]
1− φ
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d =
2αρ(1− T )
(1− φ)2 Lλ(1− φ)
[
α(1 + φ)(1− 2sk)− σ(1− φ)
]
+
2αρ(1− T )
(1− φ)2 ρ(sk − φ(1− sk))
[
α(1 + φ)(1− 2sk)(1− T )− σ(1− φ)
]
There are three real solutions to such an equation but by using expression (29)
and simulations, we can easily see that only one is available. This solution is
given by:
sn = 2
√
−p
3
cos
(
arccos
(
3q
2p
√
−3p
)
+ 4pi
3
)
− b
3a
with
p =
c
a
− b
2
3a2
q =
d
a
+
b
27a
(
2b2
a2
− 9c
a
)
It should be noted that when T = 0, the concentration of the industrial sector
in the richer country is complete (sn = 1) when the degree of trade integration
exceeds the threshold level:
φ∗ =
L+ ρ(1− k)
L+ ρk
(34)
Appendix B
In this appendix, we demonstrate the effect of the subsidy policy upon the
equilibrium outcome, i.e, the impact of an increase of the tax rate upon the three
equilibrium variables (sn, se, g).
Sign of the derivative of sn with respect to T
Using (14), (26) and (28), the derivative of sn with respect to T is given by:
dsn
dT
=
(
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂T
+
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂T
)(
1− ∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂sn
)−1
(35)
With the same expressions as are used above, we can calculate the following
partial derivatives:
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∂sn
∂se
=
1 + φ
1− φ > 0
∂se
∂g
= −αρ(2sk − 1)(1− T )
2σ(g + ρ)2
< 0
∂g
∂T
=
αρ
2σ
(
4ALσ − g√
Λ2 + 8ALTασρ
)
> 0
∂se
∂T
= −αρ(2sk − 1)
2σ(g + ρ)
< 0
∂g
∂sn
=
Lα(1− λ)
σ
(
g + 2Tσρ√
Λ2 + 8ALTασρ
)
> 0
with
Λ = α[2AL− ρT ]− ρ(σ − α)
Using signs of these partial derivatives, we see immediately that an increase
of the tax rate will reduce the spatial concentration of manufacturing firms in
the richer country, i.e, dsn/dT < 0.
Sign of the derivative of g with respect to T
Consider now the derivatives of the growth rate (26) and the income inequal-
ity (28) with respect to T . These are given by:
dg
dT
=
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
dsn
dT
(36)
dse
dT
=
∂se
∂T
+
∂se
∂g
dg
dT
(37)
Inserting (37) in (36), we can rewrite (36) as :
dg
dT
=
(
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂T
)(
1− ∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂sn
)−1
Using signs of the partial derivatives, we know that the second term of this
expression is positive so the sign of dg/dT depends upon the sign of the first
term. Using expressions of partial derivatives, we obtain:(
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂T
)
= AB
with
A =
αρ
σ(1− φ)(g + ρ)
B =
σ(1− φ)(g + ρ)(2AL− g)− Lα(1 + φ)(1− λ)(2sk − 1)(g + Tρ)√
Λ2 + 8ALTασρ
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A is positive and the denominator of B is also positive so we know that
sign(dg/dT ) = sign(B). It should be noted that without subsidy policy, all M-
firms are concentrated in the richer region when φ ≥ φ∗ (see the end of appendix
A). So by replacing φ with φ∗, we obtain:
dg
dT
> 0 if
σ(g + ρ)ρ(2AiL− g)
Lα(1− λ)(2L+ ρ)(g + Tρ) > 1
Solving this second degree inequality in g, we obtain:
dg
dT
> 0 if g < g∗ =
Υ+
√
Υ2 + 4Lσρ2[2Aσρ− Tα(1− λ)(2L+ ρ)]
2σρ
with
Υ = σρ(2AL− ρ)− Lα(1− λ)(2L+ ρ)
Note that if we prove that ρΛ < Υ then g < g∗. Indeed, the condition
ρΛ < Υ is more restrictive than g < g∗ and corresponds to:
ρα[2AL− ρT ]− ρ2(σ − α) < σρ(2AL− ρ)− Lα(1− λ)(2L+ ρ)
which is equivalent to
sn > s
∗
n =
1
2
− Lσρ(1 + λ)− 2Lα[L(1− λ) + ρ]− αρ
2(1− T )
2Lρ(1− λ)(σ − α)
We are sure that sn > s∗n if Lσρ(1+λ)−2Lα[L(1−λ)+ρ]−αρ2(1−T ) > 0.
This condition is satisfied when
λ >λ ∗ =
2Lα(L+ ρ) + αρ2(1− T )− Lσρ
L(2Lα+ σρ)
(38)
If this condition on λ is verified, then an increase of the tax rate will increase
the aggregate growth rate. Note that this condition is the strongest possible
constraint, i.e, for extreme value of φ and sn. So in most cases the constraint
is less strong than (38).
Sign of the derivative of se with respect to T
The sign of dse/dT is more easily to determined than for dg/dT . We could
work with (38) to determine the sign of dse/dT but we can determine it more
easily by considering the following expression:
dg
dT
=
(
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂T
)(
1− ∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂sn
)−1
Inserting expression (38) in this expression, we get
dg
dT
=
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
∂sn
∂se
dse
dT
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If we compare this expression with (37), we can see that the following equality
holds:
dsn
dT
=
∂sn
∂se
dse
dT
(39)
As ∂sn/∂se > 0 and dsn/dT < 0, we know that dse/dT < 0, i.e, an increase of
the tax rate will lead to a decrease of the income inequality between countries.
This proves that even if we consider extreme cases where λ <λ ∗, i.e, even if an
increase of the tax rate reduces the growth rate, it reduces the income inequality.
Therefore, for realistic cases where the subsidy policy increases the growth rate,
the decrease of income inequality is stronger.
We can also determine the effect of an increase of the tax rate upon the
Home Market Effect. Indeed, expression (39) shows that the higher the tax
rate the lower is the Home Market Effect. The reason for this is simply that
∂sn/∂se > 1, so an increase of the tax rate will decrease the concentration of
M-firms more than the income inequality.
Appendix C
Proof 1: the lower the knowledge spillovers, the higher the cost (in
terms of growth reduction) of delocation of industrial activities towards
the poorer region
For this purpose, we have to calculate the partial derivative of ∂g/∂sn with
respect to λ. Using expression of ∂g/∂sn (see appendix B), we have:
∂( ∂g∂sn )
∂λ
=− 4L2α2(1− λ)(g + Tρ)(1− sn)
(
(Λ+ 2Tσρ)
(
√
Λ2 + 8ALTασρ)3
)
− Lα
(
2(g + Tρ)√
Λ2 + 8ALTασρ
)
< 0
This result shows that a decrease of λ will increase ∂g/∂sn. It should be re-
membered that
dg
dT
=
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
dsn
dT
As dsn/dT < 0, the lower the knowledge spillovers, the higher the cost (in terms
of lost growth) of delocation of industrial activities towards the poorer country.
Proof 2: the higher the level of trade integration, the higher the
impact of the tax rate upon the delocation of industrial activities
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To do this, we have to calculate the partial derivative of dsn/dT with respect
to φ. Using expression (35) and the expressions of partial derivatives given in
Appendix B, we can rewrite:
dsn
dT
=
−αρ(2sk−1)σ(g+ρ)
(
αρ(1−T )
(g+ρ)
(
2AL−g√
Λ2+8ALTασρ
)
+ 1
)
2(1−φ)
(1+φ) +
2α2ρL(1−λ)(2sk−1)(1−T )
σ(g+ρ)2
(
g+Tρ√
Λ2+8ALTασρ
)
This expression has the form:
dsn
dT
=
X
2(1−φ)
(1+φ) + Y
where X < 0 and Y > 0. The partial derivative of dsn/dT with respect to φ
has the form:
∂(dsndT )
∂φ
=
4X
[Y (1 + φ) + 2(1− φ)]2 < 0
This result means that the higher the level of trade integration, the higher
the impact of the tax rate upon the delocation of industrial activities.
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